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This is how Kierkegaard has Vigilius Haufiiiensis, in The Coneept of Anxiety, describe Repetition by Constantin Constantius. In this passage Vigilius confirms what the reader of Repetition quickly senses: that it is a confiising book. There seems to be a diserepaney between, on the one hand, the decisive significance whieh repetition assumes in Kierkegaard's writings and, on the other hand, this work, whieh not only gives repetition its name, but also diseovers it. It is quite elear that Constantin Constantius himself understands repetition as a new eategory. He makes programmatie deelarations sueh as the following: "Repetition is the new eategory whieh is to be diseovered." [5, 130] . "Reeolleetion is the pagan [lit. "ethnieal"] view of life, repetition is the modem view" [5, 131] . But this happens in a strangely quirky fashion. In faet, in other respeets the book shows what true repetition is not. Constmitin's attempt at repetition serves only to plaee true repetition in relief And at the end, when the young man believes that he has repeated himself or taken himself again,^ it is in faet not repetition in the deeisive sense of the term. What the book sets forth as repetition is not in faet repetition.
Vigilius elaims that the eonfiision and diserepaney in the book Repetition is intentional: "But what he has diseovered he then eoneeals again by eloaking the eoneept in the jest of an analogous notion." This is repeated by Johannes Climaeus in Coneluding Unseientifie Postseript. In Kierkegaard's pseudonymous eanon there is not only interplay between the author and the work within eaeh individual work, but also among the works and their various authors. In the middle of the Postseript (whieh in its very title relates itself to the works in eonelusory fashion) there is a eommentary on Kierkegaard's works whieh are being brought to a eonelusion. This is eontained in a seetion entitled "A View of a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature." With respeet to Repetition it is stated: "And Constantin Constantius wrote, as he ealls it, 'an odd book'" [9, 220] . Vigilius' deseription has now beeome that of Constantin Constantius.'' But Johannes Climaeus adopts a similar line to that of Vigilius Haufniensis: immediately preeeding this passage he states that "a eonfiising form, fi-aught with antitheses" is employed in Repetition, beeause that whieh is to be said is of deeisive signifieanee, but it must be said without leeturing. On the one hand, it is neeessary to eoin the eoneept of repetition in order to maintain that "the immanenee of ethieal despair has been broken" and that ''the leap has been posited" [9, 219] . On the other hand, this must not be the subjeet of a straightforward leeture, but must be said indireetly through a jest.
Referring to the title page, Johannes Climaeus states that Repetition eontains a psyehologieal experiment-the subtitle reads: "A Venture in Experimental Psyehology." This ean be understood in various ways: Constantin undertakes an experiment regarding the existenee of repetition; he travels to Berlin and aseertains that it does not exist. In a eertain way he also undertakes an experiment with the young man. Repetition is not an experiment, however, but a trial.
In what follows I v^ll give a more detailed deseription, in three steps, of the meaning of the eategory of repetition. First I will point out that Constantin himself uses repetition as a eoneept of epoeh-making signifieanee. Next I will show that as a religious eategory repetition is related both to what Climaeus ealls "ethieal despair," and to what Vigilius ealls a "seeond ethies" [6, 119] . Thirdly, I will show that the diseovery of repetition as a new eategory is a (re)diseovery of what Kierkegaard ealls the ' * In the Papers, however, Constantin Constantius does call Repetition "an odd little book" [Pap. IV B 120 p. 306]. eategory of spirit. In conclusion I will revisit the question of form: Is repetition as a category inconsistent with Repetition as a book?
The Signifieanee of Repetition

a. The Modem View
On the first page of Repetition Constantin Constantius declares that for quite a period of time he has "at least occasionally" eoneemed himself with "the question of whether a repetition is possible and of its signifieanee" [5, 115] . Right from the outset one ean become confused when Constantin speaks, without explanation, of "a repetition" as well as of "the repetition." Because, what is it that is to be repeated? Constantin ^ves what appears to be a straightforward answer in the next sentence where he discusses "whether a thing gains or loses in being repeated." That which is to be repeated can apparently be anything whatever, as long as a suitable experiment can be arranged. And even though Constantin has considered the problem of repetition-" at least occasionally"-for a long time, it "suddenly" occurs to him that "of course you can travel to Berlin, where you have been before, and you can satisfy yourself about whether a repetition is possible and what its significance is" [ibid].
As if it were a sudden whim, Constantin continues by sketching, in a rather quirky fashion, the significance of repetition-not just any repetition, but repetition as a category. And repetition as a category must first be discovered. There is, however, yet another dividing line, namely that between recent times, or recent philosophy, and modemity. When the young man is brought to a stop by the problem of repetition, he tums neither to Greek nor to recent philosophy, but to Job. While the Greek chooses recollection, recent philosophy makes no movement. Or rather, to the extent that it makes a movement "it is always within immanence" [5, 161]. Just as Greek thought moved within the immanence of etemity, recent philosophy takes everything back into mediation or into suspension.^ I will retum to this point shortly. For now the important thing is that The Danish term is "Ophsevelsen" (related to the German "Aufhebung").
repetition is the modem view of life, but not in the sense that it has already been discovered. On the contrary, "repetition is the new category which is to be diseovered," and this will be a elear eontrast to reeent philosophy's talk of mediation [5, 130] . What Constantin ealls modemity is thus that whieh is to eome.
What is the meaning of this dividing line? The pagan view is eharaeterized by reeolleetion. This means that the truth is found by going baek. Baek, that is, to etemity, whieh forms the basis of all reality. In other words this is the immanenee of etemity. Repetition also has the apparent meaning of going baek, beeause that whieh is to be repeated existed before. But for Kierkegaard repetition is something whieh is to happen. The forward movement takes on deeisive signifieanee. As early as the first page of Repetition, Constantin Constantius says that both reeolleetion and repetition are the same movement, but "in opposite direetions": baekwards and forwards [5, 115] . In simplified form we ean say that reeolleetion retums to that whieh was, and in so doing does not really repeat it in the present. Mediation is a form of repetition whieh does not really make any differenee. On the other hand, repetition in the striet sense makes a real differenee. This is what we should read into the formulation: the whole of existenee, whieh has been, now eomes into being [5, 131] . The emphasis is upon this beeoming. This is of deeisive importanee, beeause the movement baekwards, "the baek door of reeolleetion," is elosed (as Climaeus says in the Postseript [9, 174] ). There is only the movement forward.* The future is granted deeisive signifieanee, but in a paradoxieal fashion-by means of repetition.
What I have said above points forward toward Philosophieal Fragments and the Postscripts Repetition eontains a sketeh of the antithesis with whieh the Philosophieal Fragments begins and whieh reeeives further treatment in the Postseript. the antithesis between the Soeratie and the Christian. As has been mentioned, aeeording to Constantin Constantius, the diseovery of repetition as a eategory is of epoeh-making signifieanee. Modemity, of whieh he speaks, points baek to Christianity-but to the Christianity whose signifieanee must first be (re)diseovered.
b. Repetition as Transeendenee
As has already been mentioned, repetition is a word with many meanings. In an immediate sense it points baekward, beeause that whieh is repeated has already been. Repetition is that the same thing happens again. But Kierkegaard emphasizes that repetition is a beeoming. Repetition is something whieh is to happen. But to the extent that repetition is something one aspires to it seems to eonnote uniformity: nothing new must happen. One proteets oneself by doing the same thing over and over again. This is what the bourgeois philistine does.
In his use of the eoneept of repetition, Kierkegaard means the opposite of this. Courage is required for repetition, and this is so beeause repetition is not something whieh eomes naturally, but Involves a fundamental transformation. More speeifieally, it eonsists in repeating something whieh has been lost. Let us see in more detail how this is so.
Repetition is diseovered as a separate eategory when it takes on this added signifieanee. It is a requirement, something whieh is to happen, and as a requirement it lies within what Kierkegaard ealls the ethieal. Constantin Constantius puts forth the slogan that "repetition is the watehword of every ethieal view" [5, 131] Vigilius now repeats the antithesis between the Greek and the modem whieh Constantin sketehed in Repetition. He differentiates between the first and the seeond philosophy: the first denotes "the totality of seienee whieh one could call the pagan [lit. "the ethnical"], whose essenee is immanence, or aeeording to the Greeks, reeolleetion;" while the seeond philosophy is "that of whieh the essenee is transeendenee or repetition" [6, 119] . "Transeendenee or repetition." In Repetition it had been stated that repetition "is and remains a transeendenee" [5, 161] . This must be understood against the baekground of despair over the ethieal. As I said in eonneetion with the Postseript: in emphasizing repetition as a new eategory, the intention is to assert that the immanenee of ethieal despair has been broken and the leap has been posited. Repetition as a eategory thus signifies a liberation or a release fi'om the power of the ethieal to bind or to judge.^ Repetition is not so mueh to regain something by one's own strength as it is to reeeive again something whieh has been lost to oneself But what has been lost is in faet one's self Sin means that one is imprisoned by oneself, that one eannot break free beeause one is bound by oneself Repetition thus eomes to mean reeoneiliation.^ And this repetition begins in faith. Therefore it is stated in slogan-like terms that "repetition is the eonditio sine qua non for every issue in dogmaties" [5, 131] . "If repetition is not posited, dogmaties eannot exist at all," Vigilius adds [6, 117n] .
Here the eonneetion between Fear and Trembling and Repetition is very elear. Repetition in its deepest sense is the double movement of faith. As mentioned, Constantin Constantius makes use of the key phrase from Fear and Trembling when he speaks of repetition as a movement by virtue of the absurd. But there is an important differenee. The eategory of repetition is related to the ethieal, to despair over the ethieal. The ethieal requirement is repetition: to will oneself, speeifieally to will Cf once again Vigilius: "If repetition is not posited, then ethics becomes a binding power. This is probably why he says that repetition is the watchword of the ethical view" (6, 1 Hn).
Cf Repetition is a work eomplete in itself to a lesser extent than the other books. If one takes one's eue from the title. Repetition-which, ineidentally, is also repeated as the heading for the seeond part of the bookthe purpose of the work is to formulate the eoneept of repetition. And in fact Repetition does discover a category which is of decisive significance for the rest of Kierkegaard's works. But in order to understand repetition as a category we must inelude other works than Repetition itself Kierkegaard also eomments upon Repetition in his Papers, and espeeially in the drafts of his "Open Letter to Herr Professor Heiberg, Knight of the Dannebrog from Constantin Constantius." Heiberg had "eorreeted" Constantin in an artiele in whieh he had asserted that repetition belonged to the world of natural phenomena. This "eorreetion" now provokes Constantin to eome forward and state direetly his main thesis, whieh he had wished to eoneeaj in Repetition.
One of Constantin's key words makes another appearanee in the sketeh by Vigilius fi-om whieh I quoted at the beginning of the present artiele, namely the word "pregnanee." There is "only one repetition in the pregnant sense, and it is "the repetition of the individuality itself, raised to a new power." This is repetition sensu eminentiori, and, Constantin adds, it is "freedom's deepest interest" [Pap. IV B 111 p. 270]. This must be understood in a double fashion. Repetition is the "task for freedom"-that is, for the individual as a self-but repetition simultaneously is freedom. It ean be seen that the question in Repetition is not about "repetition of something external, but about the repetition of his [that is, the young man's] freedom" [Pap. B 117 p. 284]. Repetition in the pregnant sense is to be seen "as the task for freedom and as freedom" [ibid, p. 293] . Repetition "means freedom itself [Pap. IV B 120 p. 308].
In the Papers Constantin says that the eoneept of repetition has a history in "the sphere of individual freedom," "beeause freedom passes through several stages in order to reaeh itself [Pap. IV B 117 p. 281]. He differentiates between three stages: a) at the first stage, freedom is qualified as desire; b) at the seeond stage freedom is qualified as shrewdness; e) at the third freedom is qualified in relation to itself Here it eomes to itself. "Freedom itself is now repetition" [ibid, p. 282]. It is-in a passage I have already eited-to take oneself baek (to repeat oneself) [ibid.] .
This definition of the eoneept of repetition is a (re)diseovery of the eoneept of spirit. The individual beeomes himself by eoming to himself, or by eoming baek to himself in the movement forward-by regaining himself. And spirit means preeisely to eome to oneself in regaining oneself In his drafl, Constantin Constantius does not say this direetly, but in the Papers he repeatedly returns to the signifieanee of repetition in the realm of the spirit. And in Repetition the young man eoneludes by saying that in a human life "only the repetition of the spirit [is] possible" [5, 186] . It is, however, only in The Coneept of Anxiety and subsequent works that spirit is explieitly eonneeted to the regaining of freedom and to reeoneiliation.
In the drafts of his reply to Heiberg, Constantin does not eoneeal his diseovery. On the eontrary, he insists upon it almost as though he has been wronged. He explains Repetition by developing its prineipal idea. But the Constantin whom we read in the Papers is no longer the Constantin who had eonneetions with the young man. It is Constantin who takes possession of his book and asserts himself as its author. In the letter to his "dear reader" whieh eoneludes Repetition, Constantin states that he has allowed the young man to eome into being [5, 191] . Now, in the Papers, not only the young man, but also the experiment-and thus the "odd" book-are retracted. The eonfusion is ended, and the book beeomes something other than what it was, just as Constantin has beeome another author. The faet that the pseudonym writes himself out of a job was a bit too mueh. In any ease, the drafts of the reply to Heiberg remained drafts. Instead, Constantin attempts to do what he had already done at the eonelusion of Repetition: to write to his "dear reader." This also ends up as a draft.
Melancholia and Observation
Vigilius said that what Constantin Constantius has discovered "he then eoneeals again by eloaking the concept in the jest of an analogous notion" [6, 116n] . But just a couple of pages into Repetition Constantin Constantius declares, "repetition, that is aetuality and the seriousness of existenee" [5, 116] . Does the eonfusing and antithetieal form do anything other than eonflise and ereate distanee from what is said about repetition as a eategory? In the retrospeetive glanee in the Papers, Constantin Constantius says that he has caused repetition to come into existence "by illuminating it with the antithesis of jest and of despair" [Pap. IV B 117 p. 295] .'^ If Repetition is not only to state, but also to demonstrate, what repetition is, it does so negatively, in the form of an antithesis, the antithesis of despair. But does it do so? In the Postscript Climacus asserts that Repetition is definitely a ease of doubly refteeted eommunieation. Beeause the eommunieation takes plaee in the form of an experiment, it "produees an opposition to itself [9, 220] . But does Repetition eontain the tension between eommunieation and form whieh is necessary to doubly reflected communication? Does Repetition as a work cohere with repetition as a eategory?
First of all it is worth noting the faet that Constantin Constantius himself talks about "the book," Repetition, and in so doing speaks direetly to the book's reader. After having read the ftnal letters from the young man the reader must turn the book sidewise to read the dedieation: "To the Worthy Mr. X, The Real Reader of This Book." The reader is literally drawn into the book, but more or less only to be sent out of it again. The text addresses itself directly to its reader and provides a description of who this reader is.
I will not discuss in any more detail this interplay between the text and the reader.'^ Instead I will examine the circumstance that Constantin Constantius and the young man produce portraits of one another. The key terms in these mutual portraits are melancholia and observation, respectively.
Constantin Constantius attempts to describe how the young man's love has gone wrong. He speaks of the young man's "mistake" [5, 120] . "His depression ensnared him more and more" [5, 121] . Constantin links depression with recollection in a manner that implies their iantithesis to repetition. The young man's mistake was that he "stood at the end instead of at the beginning" [5, 120] . "Right away, within a few days," he was capable "of recollecting his love," and thus he was "essentially ftnished with the entire relationship" [5, 119] . In the middle of the relationship the young man feels a melancholy longing [5, 120] .
Constantin Constantius subsequently notes that the young man, in his relationship to Constantin himself, "stands in a continuing eontradietion to himself he wishes for me to be his eonftdant, and yet he does not wish it-indeed, it causes him anxiety" [5, 156] . The young man also speaks of his anxiety.''' For his part he describes Constantin as an observer who has "a demonic power" [5, 163] . Constantin views himself as an observer. The young man repeats this view while assigning another meaning to it. He portrays Constantin as a detached observer who subjects every passion "to the cold regimen of reflection" [5, 163] .
In an entry in his papers from 1846 Kierkegaard notes that in Repetition "feeling and irony are kept separate from one another, each in its representative: the young man and Constantin" [Pap. VII' B 83] . When, as quoted above, Constantin spoke of an "antithesis of despair," who is it, then, who despairs? The young man describes himself as despairing and "in contradiction to himself [5, 171f ] . But in the Papers Constantin observes that "I despair of the possibility [of repetition], and I now yield to the young man who will discover repetition with his religious The young man despairs when his life comes to a halt at the problem of repetition. It is thus the young man who is also to diseover repetition. But at the same time it is Constantin who reports on this diseovery as a detached observer.
These two modes of existence-shrewd observation and melancholia-are two ways in which repetition does not succeed. The mark of melancholia is that one holds oneself in reserve. One will not wholly will that whieh one wills.'' There is also a elearly diseemible reserve in the making of shrewd observations, in whieh one plaees oneself outside of that whieh one observes. Constantin's "despair" is that he is ineapable of diseovering repetition by himself Thus Repetition as a work gives a negative delineation of repetition as a eategory. But in its deseription of negative phenomena-melaneholia and detaehment, despair and anxiety-it is also the ease that Repetition points beyond itself The analyses of the negative are developed in works whieh appeared after Repetition, primarily in The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death.
'5 Melancholia is "the sin of not willing deeply and profoundly" (Either/Or [3, 177]).
